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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to get acquainted with the ways how to improve the safety management system during
cargo aircraft handling. The first chapter is dedicated to general information about air cargo transportation.
This includes the history or types of cargo aircraft handling, but also the means of handling. The second part is
focused on detailed description of cargo aircraft handling, including a description of activities that are performed
before and after handling. The following part of this paper covers a theoretical interpretation of safety, safety
indicators and legislative provisions related to the safety of cargo aircraft handling. The fourth part of this paper
analyzes the fault trees of events which might occur during handling. The factors found by this analysis are
compared with safety reports of FedEx. Based on the comparison, there is a proposal on how to improve the
safety management in this transportation company.
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1. Introduction
People were trying to find ways how to fly from the begin-
ning of 20th century. In 1912, the brothers Wrights finally
succeeded. Since then the aviation has gone through a large
development. As people started travelling by planes, the need
for transportation of freight has consequently increased and
first cargo transport companies were found. In the second
half of the 20th century, Federal Express (now FedEx) was
founded. This company was focused solely on air freight ex-
press, not for the transport of people.
One of the most important parts of air transport operation
is safety. The level of safety in air traffic companies is in-
dicated by a number of air traffic incidents and accidents [1].
This number of incidents and accident is currently so low that
the air traffic companies have to analyse smaller events or mi-
nor indicators instead of real accidents, which happen rarely
[2]. These events are monitored and analysed on a daily ba-
sis. This paper evaluates current quality of safety during the
cargo handling of FedEx aircrafts and search for additional
ways how to improve the safety procedures and safety perfor-
mance [3, 4].
2. Specifics of air cargo transportation
Transportation of freight is different from transportation of
passengers, especially the procedures of handling are differ-
ent. Actions which have to be performed during technical
handling of passengers aircraft are, inter alia, boarding of
passengers, loading and unloading of baggage, loading and
unloading of cargo, catering supplies and cleaning of aircraft.
On the other hand, activities performed during business han-
dling of cargo aircrafts can include only crew boarding and
loading and unloading of cargo.
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In cargo transportation business there are three ways of
transporting cargo. The first method of cargo transporta-
tion is bulk. Bulk aircrafts are divided into several segments
which are loaded with packages. These packages have to be
loaded one after another and secured by correct ways of load-
ing. The correct procedure for loading packages at FedEx is
called T-stacking. T-stacking prevents packages from crash
and ensures uniform weight distribution in each segment of
aircraft. A pattern of T-stacking loading is displayed on fig-
ure 1 below.
Freight loaded into the unit load devices (ULD) repre-
sents the second way how to transport freight by air. There
are two types of unit load devises. One of them is a container.
A metallic container can have many shapes. Smaller contain-
ers are used for loading on the main deck of narrow-body air-
crafts or loading on the lower deck of these aircrafts. Larger
containers are used for loading on main and lower decks of
wide-body aircrafts. Some containers are specially modified
to transport vehicles or cattle.
The second type of unit load devices is a pallet. Freight
is loaded into pallets, but individual packages have to be se-
cured against crash by safety nets. Pallets do not have walls
like containers so freight cannot lean on. The function of
walls is provided by safety nets.
All of ULDs (containers, pallets and nets) have to be cer-
tificated according to the IATA rules. IATA has published
ULD Regulations, which contain all rules for construction,
transportation and using of unit load devices. ULD Regula-
tions also define the method of marking. Every ULD has its
own unique designation. It is composed of prefix (type of
container), unique number and suffix (code of airline) [5].
The last way how to transport freight by air is the use of
special aircrafts to transport oversized and extremely heavy
freight. An example of that aircraft can be Antonov An-225
Mrija.
Figure 1. Bulk loading
3. Procedures of Handling
Aircrafts that are used for distribution of shipments to areas
like the Czech Republic are called Feeders in FedEx termi-
nology. Aircrafts used for this distribution are mostly ATR
types.
The FedEx operation at Vaclav Havel Airport Prague can
be divided into the AM operation (arrivals) and PM opera-
tion (departures). FedEx ATR aircraft arrives on Tuesday,
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. Departures are on Mon-
day, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. During the day or
on non-flying days is the plane parked on apron E1A. Han-
dling is provided by Menzies Aviation Company.
3.1 Unloading
The unloading process usually starts few minutes after the
aircraft arrives. Several types of ground support equipment
(GSE) are used for unloading. When the propeller is stopped
and anti-collision beacon is switched off, the loading leader
can connect a ground power unit (GPU). Loading belts are
used for unloading shipments from aircraft. Shipments from
loading belts are moved to trolleys (the same trolleys, which
are used to transfer baggage). These trolleys are moved to a
warehouse where the sorting is performed. It is very impor-
tant to follow few safety rules during unloading and during
approaching of GSE to aircraft. The most important rule is
using a guide person. The guide person is a person who nav-
igates GSEs driver and shows by hand signals the distance
between the GSE and the aircraft. The minimum distance
between the loading belt and the edge of cargo doors must
be longer than 5 feet. The second important rule is testing
of potential defects of each ground support equipment before
final approach of the aircraft. Other safety rules can include
e.g. correct positioning of cones, chocking wheels or walk-
ing around wings and propeller. All the safety rules are su-
pervised by a Ramp Agent of FedEx.
FedExs Ramp Agents is determined to ensure compliance
of all safety rules. His further responsibility is preventing
the delays of handling. Every small delay has to be notified
to the FedEx operation centre in Paris. The Ramp Agents
have to fill a special safety report during every morning and
evening operation. This report includes fields to fill in exact
time when each handling activity was executed.
3.2 Loding
Every shipment has to be prepared before loading into air-
craft. This preparation includes x-ray and weighting of every
shipment. After that, shipments are loaded to vans and trans-
ferred to airports warehouse. After that, the shipments are put
over from vans to trolleys. Trolleys are weighted by fork-lift
weight and the weight of shipments is calculated by differ-
ence of gross weight and weight of empty trolley. A table
with these weights is sent to the Load Control office, where a
Load Plan is drawn up.
Before any loading is started, it is important to check that
tail stand is fixed on the aircrafts tail. A tail stand secures
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the construction of an aircraft in case of overturning to tail.
It is also important to make sure that cones are in a correct
position and that aircraft is fully choked.
Any loading can be started only in accordance to the Load
Plan which is created by the Load Control office. Loading
usually takes one hour. All the loading activities are checked
by FedExs Ramp Agent. Every safety deviation is written
down to a form report. After a departure, all deviations are
reported to the Head office of handling company. This report-
ing ensures appropriate quality of handling services.
4. Identification and rating of risks
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) publishes all the
safety regulations in civil aviation in all European air space.
Regulations are also set for handling procedures. The two
most important ones are Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 [6]
and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1018
[7], where the second one defines risky events that can
happen during all activities related to air civic aviation.
These events are classified into logical groups. Regulation
2015/1018 defines events, which are used in safety reporting
systems like SMS (Safety Management System) for easier
classification of reported events.
Potential high-level events that can happen during a han-
dling procedure of FedExs aircraft, or any other cargo air-
craft, have been selected from EASA classification (selected
from [7]):
 A collision or a near collision on the ground or in the
air, with another aircraft, terrain or obstacle.
 Leakage of any fluid which resulted in a fire hazard or
possible hazardous contamination of aircraft structure,
systems or equipment, or which has or could have en-
dangered the aircraft, its occupants or any other person.
 Push-back, power-back or taxi interference by vehicle,
equipment or person.
 Foreign object on the aerodrome movement area which
has or could have endangered the aircraft, its occupants
or any other person.
 Passengers or unauthorized person left unsupervised
on apron.
 Aerodrome security related occurrences (for example:
unlawful entry, sabotage, bomb threat).
 Incorrect handling or loading of passengers, baggage,
mail or cargo, likely to have a significant effect on air-
craft mass and/or balance (including significant errors
in loadsheet calculations).
 Incorrect stowage or securing of baggage, mail or
cargo likely in any way to endanger the aircraft, its
equipment or occupants or to impede emergency evac-
uation.
 Transport, attempted transport or handling of danger-
ous goods which resulted or could have resulted in the
safety of the operation being endangered or led to an
unsafe condition (for example: dangerous goods inci-
dent or accident as defined in the ICAO Technical In-
structions).
 Non-compliance with required aircraft ground han-
dling and servicing procedures, especially in de-icing,
refuelling or loading procedures, including incorrect
positioning or removal of equipment.
 Failure, malfunction or defect of ground equipment
used for ground handling, resulting into damage or po-
tential damage to the aircraft (for example: tow bar or
GPU (Ground Power Unit)).
 Missing, incorrect or inadequate de-icing/anti-icing
treatment.
 Damage to aircraft by ground handling equipment or
vehicles including previously unreported damage.
 Any occurrence where the human performance has di-
rectly contributed to or could have contributed to an
accident or a serious incident.
A Fault tree analysis (FTA) has been selected to find
safety factors. For the application of FTA, events specified
in [7] had to be detailed because the FTA requires well-
described top events [8, 9]. As stated, there can be high num-
bers of detailed events, i.e. many events can be classified
under the points from [7].
4.1 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) was invented with the aim of search-
ing for original reasons of accident in civil aviation and nu-
clear power engineering. It is based on quality definition of
top events, which means that the top events have to be as
detailed as possible. Also, an important part of the FTA is
determination of the circuit of investigation. Results of the
FTA are represented by factors that could be the first in a se-
quence of events, which lead into an accident. FTA is based
on a graphical representation. Such graphical representation
helps finding the real factors [7].
FTA is shown on one specific detailed event Damage of
propeller due to collision of propeller and trolley, which can
be classified under Damage to aircraft by ground handling
equipment or vehicles including previously unreported dam-
age [7].
4.2 Damage of Propeller due to Collision of Pro-
peller and Trolley
Any collision occurring during handling means high financial
expenses. A collision between trolleys and propeller is very
probable, because trolleys are being manipulated in a close
proximity to propeller. Too close approaching of trolleys to
propeller is prevented by positioning cones. Cones have to
be located one meter from the planes nose, ends of wings
and tail. Cones have to be located also before front and rear
loading doors and in front of propeller.
FedEx focuses on two main rules walking around pro-
peller and wings and using a guide person. Prohibition of
walking or riding with GSE under wings is not a standard
rule in other airlines. It causes that loaders with experience
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Figure 2. FTA - Collision of propeller and trolley
from other airlines can forget about the prohibition of walk-
ing under wings during FedEx operation. The Team leader of
loading should therefore notify the loaders of every specific
FedEx rule before loading or unloading gets started. The first
factor found by FTA is the absence of briefing before opera-
tion. The second factor could be training of loaders, which
should know all FedExs rules from the trainings they have to
pass.
All leaders should also knowwhere to place cones around
aircraft. If they did not pass training on the handling proce-
dures of FedExs aircraft and would not perform proper brief-
ing, then the cones could end up in wrong position, which
might have a negative impact on safety distance between trol-
leys and propeller.
Another important rule during FedEx operation is using
of guide person. If a guide person is not used or if it uses
incorrect hand signals, the safety distance might not be kept
and collision can happen. Without a proper training and brief-
ing before loading, a loader would not know the right hand
signals or procedures that every guide person has to use dur-
ing each approach of GSE to the aircraft.
The last factor which has been found by the FTA is bad
GSE condition. However, such factor like a bad condition of
GSE, are beyond the influence of FedEx. FedEx assumes that
the condition of GSE is good, because all GSE are owned by
handling company Menzies Aviation.
Figure 2 shows a preview of FTA tree, which considers
factors like training, absence of briefing or bad GSE condi-
tion.
5. Determination of factors
FTA has been applied on all defined top events chosen from
EASA classification list that are specific for FedEx opera-
tion. Results of this analysis are presented on a list of fac-
tors, which are found to be the original causes of accidents
or incidents. The way how to find out if a current collec-
tion of safety data in FedEx is focused on collection of real
factors is comparison. FedEx has a wide database of morn-
ing and evening reports in which all safety deviations that
happened since 2011 can be found. The List 1 below shows
several kinds of safety deviations and its quantity. All data in
the List 1 have been gathered by analysing each report since
2011. The List 2 below shows all factors, which have been
found by the FTA. A comparison of these two lists enables
us to assess if the surveillance of FedExs Ramp Agents is re-
ally focused on the original factors or if it focuses only on
smaller events. Effective prevention against accidents during
handling can occur only if both surveillance and safety data
collection are focused on correct original factors.
List 1: Quantity of safety deviations from 2011 to 2016
 Wrong weight written on trolleys
 Walking under wings
 Wrong positioning of cones
 Issues with warehouse messages
 Chocking
 Missing of guide person
List 1: Factors found by the FTA
 Training
 Briefing before the start of handling
 FOD check
After comparing the List 1 and 2, we can conclude that
the factors found by the FTA do not match with the events in
FedEx reports. It means that the reports have to be changed
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in order to increase the quality and usability of safety data
collection.
6. Conclusion
Safety management is an important part of every airline. The
aim of safety management is prevention from accidents and
incidents in operations. Primary objective of the safety man-
agement work is a research of official reports of incidents and
accidents. Nevertheless, this is currently not enough [10]. To-
day, it is important to perform a surveillance of events and
factors and thoroughly collect this data.
Two types of analysis and their following comparison has
enabled us to found out that current safety data collection
supplemented by the reports filled by a Ramp Agent are not
sufficient enough. It is necessary to change these reports.
The first problem with the current reports is a lack of their
focus. The reports are not focused on real problems, which
can lead to accidents. It is necessary to add some fields into
current reports. These new fields would focus on safety fac-
tors. Then, after some time, a good database of factors devi-
ations will be created. A thorough analysis of this database
will help us finding which factors are repeated most often.
Consequently, FedEx will be able to improve its handling
procedures to prevent the occurrence of undesirable factors
during operations. As a result, the overall safety will be in-
creased.
The second problem with the current reports is the way
how data is currently collected. For example, the reports
miss checkbox fields. Based on FedExs reports analysis it
was found that several important reported events in reports
do not have its own field. These events are currently filled
into a remarks field so the recording of important events hap-
pens only if the Ramp Agent does not forget to fill this field
and/or if he has enough time for that during handling. Exis-
tence of checkboxes on reports could have a positive impact
on quantity of collected safety data.
Only a focus on the real causes of accidents or incidents
and ways how the data about such incidents is collected can
improve the risk management in FedEx Czech Republic.
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